The Impact of CFSP on Bulgaria’s Foreign Policy

Prof. GEORGY GENOV
University for National and World Economy, Sofia, Bulgaria,
member of the Bulgarian EC Studies Association (BECSA)

The ‘European project’ has grown so as to have a major impact on nearly all aspects of European politics and a deep influence on the societies of the participating states, even on states outside the union, for instance of the many states applying to become members of the European Union.’ ¹

By June 2004, all chapters in the membership negotiations between the EU and Bulgaria had been closed. Chapters 26 and 27 were among those that provoked no problems – both were officially opened for negotiation in May 2000 and closed in November and June of the same year, respectively.² All five of the subsequent European Commission progress reports underlined the compliance of Bulgarian legislation with the CFSP acquis, and Brussels has judged that Bulgaria will be able to adopt and implement the entire CFSP acquis by the time of accession; so far there has been a general lack of requests for derogation or transitional periods on both sides. Substantial convergence between Bulgaria’s foreign policy and the EU’s CFSP is evident.

The seemingly easy negotiations were preceded by an uneasy and hard five years for Bulgarian society and the country’s foreign policy processes. The most noteworthy problems were:

• Embedding the foreign policy change/reorientation after the transition in mass perceptions and attitudes (including foreign policy values, priorities and orientation towards alliances and engagement);

• Re-constructing and establishing the new institutional and legal network of external relations;

• Attaining a wide and stable national consensus on the scope, dimensions and range of foreign policy priorities, specifically on the need for EU and NATO membership in the first place (and not just for security considerations);

• Grasping the cognitive dynamics of the new experiences as a new actor establishing a new image and status in the relevant international milieu;

• Assessing and re-vitalising foreign policy as national asset and a means to achieve national goals.

Negotiations related to CFSP were not and are not in the centre of public debate, nor have they raised substantial controversies within elite and public opinion. It is tempting to speculate about the Europeanising of the society and national discourse, but in my opinion this manifestly high degree of consensus is predominantly due inter alia also to:

• some lack of knowledge and sufficient information about biases and blunders in the seemingly-smooth mechanics of intergovernmental cooperation in CFSP;

• the tradition among ruling elites to assume that negotiating on CFSP is their business, and to take national consensus for granted;

• the wish to comply with the ultimate end of EU membership;

• a certain underestimation of the CFSP in the public debate and the media as it was not closely related to mass expectations about the benefits of EU membership.

An important dimension of integration for Bulgaria is the output that the EU provides which Bulgaria alone cannot: Europeanisation, welfare and security.³ Similar to any other country, Bulgaria’s foreign policy preferences depend on: long-lasting national political and security orientations; security culture (overburdened by historical memory, prejudices and misperceptions on an individual and group level); geopolitical position (clear-cut notions and understanding of unique, favourable changes); interests (quite often an unclear and contestable articulation, save for the consensual perception of European values and Euro-Atlantic priorities).

In Bulgaria, there is a gradual and slow transition from a foreign policy decision-making approach (both in the realist and neo-realist versions) towards a pragmatic, adaptation approach.⁴ Integration and EU activities are predominantly seen as a mix of cooperation between states (within CFSP), the making of common and binding decisions (particularly in the Community realm), and the transnationalisation of society and the economy.⁵

Since 1994, Bulgaria has been invited to join various EU endeavours, common positions and demarches. It has done so consistently, including support for negative measures against third countries whatever the cost. Bulgaria established and sustains excellent relations with all of its neighbours, a formidable historical accomplishment in itself for the Balkans. In its relations with third countries, Bulgaria is keen on its active and promising role in promoting regional cooperation and stabilisation in South-Eastern Europe, where it participates in all subregional and multilateral initiatives and bodies, supporting and joining all important missions and projects. Government officials emphasise the important stabilisation role Sofia has played during the prolonged Balkan crises, which is likely to reinforce the Union’s ability to cope with similar crises in the future – beside contributing to overall security.⁶

Bulgaria’s main foreign policy accomplishments over the past year include: NATO membership; chairing the UN Security Council; clear and real engagements in international anti-terrorist campaigns (Iraq included); chairing the OSCE; European Parliament assent to Bulgarian accession; and signing the Accession Treaty on 26 April 2005. In compliance with obligations stemming from CFSP participation the following should be specifically stressed:

• Bulgaria accepted and realised in its diplomacy EU world-wide priorities, notably South America (visits by the President, Speaker of the National Assembly and Foreign Minister – all commented on in public discourse), Northern Africa (including a complicated and sensitive humanitarian problem with Libya), the Near East and Transcaucasia, Asia;

• Further concentration on cooperation and participation in EU policies in South-Eastern Europe;

• Sofia joined EU positions in international organisations (UN, WTO, WIPO, WHO, FAO, OSCE, etc);

• Further development of bilateral relations with EU member states;

• Substantial efforts were made to increase the administrative and intellectual capacity to develop and realise foreign and alliance policy as an EU member state (a Diplomatic Institute was established in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; dialogue with the public and NGOs was institutionalised);

• Optimisation of administrative structures in compliance with member state experience (including the new member states);

• Launching a renovated communication and information strategy;

• Sofia joined ranks with the EU and its member states in specific cases: Georgia, Ukraine.

For the period 2004-05 in regard to CFSP three major events are of importance in shaping Bulgaria’s particular positions:

• the constitutional treaty;

• the experience and specific acts and assessments of the new member states;

• the Iraq divide and its implications for the conceptual/doctrinal development of ESDP.

The first raises the question about the role of small countries in the enlarged EU. Although Bulgaria’s integration policy still has to be developed, it is reasonable to expect that the country will align with new and old small member states, to maintain and reinforce the Community method so as to sustain an acceptable and more equal role in decision-making, and to defend specific national interests (or national perceptions and interpretations of common interests).⁷

Bulgaria will abstain at least initially from long-term options for coalitions, taking sides, etc – following the experience of the new member states in relation to declared or perceived national interests and their balance with European public goods. In particular it still lacks the experience and complexity of multiple coalition-building in a large Union.⁸ The directoire option makes a small and brand new member state understandably uncomfortable.

Bulgaria supported ‘double-hatting’ – the EU foreign minister – to maximise continuity and improve the efficiency of the Union’s representation and role in world matters, including the right to make CFSP initiatives (thus increasing the ‘European reflex’ in this area).⁹ Support was given to both flexibility and structured cooperation (due to concerns about Bulgaria’s limited resources).

For elites and society, an Atlanticist foreign policy is naturally accepted: the USA is the security guarantor and NATO’s leader. A unipolar international system, with the pole as a democratic, strong and physically distant country, is considered an acceptable and appropriate structure with fixed rules of the game, providing a sufficient level of security. So Bulgaria signed the ‘Letter of the Eight’ (‘new Europeans’), and sent to and supports a battalion of 500 men in Iraq. One should not forget that in 2001-02, Bulgarian society was uncertain about its place in Europe as a wanted and equal partner/ally, and there were and still are some differences in the perceptions about situations and threats far from Brussels but close to Sofia.¹⁰

The government, elite and majority of the public see no conflict or imbalance between the two priorities, European and Atlantic. Rather it is an explicit, balanced dual asymmetry in excellence: military-security and operation for NATO; economic, welfare, social and the non-military dimensions of security (broadly understood), for the EU. NATO rather than the EU is and will remain the most important security organisation for Bulgaria – the farther to the east and south a country is, the greater its dependence on NATO operational capabilities as a deterrent against security threats. ESDP is seen a complimentary to this.¹¹ Bulgaria welcomed and supports the emerging ESDP as a policy to reinforce the Union’s contribution to peace and stability on the continent and elsewhere – in compliance with its strategic goals of EU and NATO membership.

We share the view that being able to deliver an effective security and defence policy is essential for EU credibility – increased crisis-management capabilities under ESDP are a vital element of security policy. With participation in CFSP and ESDP, the importance given to the European Security Strategy will grow.¹²

Strategic culture¹³ in Bulgaria, preoccupied with security and inclusion, is rooted in history and geopolitics – the territories lost in the Balkan and World Wars, all neighbours being one-time war enemies, etc. No wonder there are widespread feelings of insecurity. Hence the need to make a choice of a security guarantor amidst great powers. At the beginning of the 1990s, Bulgaria was again in a state of diplomatic insulation with its international standing questioned (just like after World War II), and the salient issues were territorial defence, credible international guarantees, engagement. There were then two years of public discussion about neutrality as a policy option. But once the choice was made for NATO, a national consensus was reached, and public attention shifted to economic reforms and welfare matters. No wonder there was no public discourse about ESDP.

So what we see is the presence of both defensive culture (‘avoid wars – wars don’t pay’; historical memories and narratives) and activist culture (adaptation policy). September 11 marked a turn to an orientation towards soft security policy instruments, the growth of ‘We the Europeans’ identity and ‘Our European values’. My point is that there is growing awareness of the European context. Somewhat clear evidence in this respect is the new National Security Strategy adopted by the government, which reflects the European Security Strategy.¹⁴

Sofia supports the Union’s overall approach to both the military and civilian dimensions of conflict prevention and crisis management and has repeatedly stated its willingness to contribute to future EU military operations and to participate in their definition and development. But Bulgaria is and will be against involving or deploying its forces in neighbouring countries even for peacekeeping missions.

Over the last year Atlanticism has been questioned, due to the developments regarding EU membership, and the developments (or lack of them) in Iraq, including the failure to secure some semi-promised benefits (not least Iraqi debt to Bulgaria) from the loyalty shown to the US.¹⁵

To sum up, Bulgaria in the last several years was slowly but steadily advancing towards a committed European posture in security and defence matters, and proof of this is the development of a ‘European reflex’ in foreign policy.

The looming coveted membership of the Union to be sure stimulates a more positive and enlightened attitude in particular towards CFSP/ESDP. So Bulgaria’s stance is evolving to that of a committed member of EU and NATO. In the CFSP/ESDP field, Bulgaria will be a constructive member of the Union, duly assuming and fulfilling its obligations in terms of crisis management or relevant foreign policy initiatives. It is realistic to expect that stability in South-Eastern Europe and close ties with the US and NATO will be Bulgaria’s priorities at the time of accession.

Needless to say, as and when it is an EU member state, Bulgaria will support and vote for further enlargement. The Black Sea region is qualified as sensitive for our foreign policy. As by 2007 the Western Balkans will be encircled by a ring of EU (and NATO) member states, Sofia will actively support and help the countries in question – for the sake of an irreversible transformation of the region into a zone of stability, peace and cooperation.

Footnotes:

¹ Morten Kelstrup, Integration Policy: Between Foreign Policy and Diffusion, Copenhagen Peace Research Institute, Working Paper 17/2000, p. 3.

² For an earlier report on the subject, see R. Stefanova, ‘Bulgaria’, in Antonio Missiroli, ed., Bigger EU, Wider CFSP, Stronger ESDP? The View from Central Europe, European Union Institute for Security Studies Occasional Paper no. 24, April 2002, pp. 52-6.

³ Kelstrup, Integration Policy, part 5.1.

⁴ Ibid., part 3.

⁵ Ibid., part 4.2.

⁶ The author largely relies on private interviews with officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the ‘Euro-Atlantic Integration and International Security’ Department, the Ministry of Economy, and the National Security Service, Sofia, January – March 2005.

⁷ See Christian Franck and Dorota Pyszna-Nigge, New Members, IGC and the Constitutional Treaty: Positions of Acceding Countries from Central Europe in the Debate on The EU’s Future. Second annual report for the project ‘CEEC-DEBATE’ (the debate on the finalité politique of the EU in the applicant countries from Central and Eastern Europe), Université Catholique de Louvain, October 2004, p. 10.

⁸ On the complexity of integration policy, see Bjorn Moller, Privatisation of Conflict, Security and War, Danish Institute for International Studies Working Paper no. 2005/2, pp. 4-8.

⁹ See Franck and Pyszna-Nigge, New Members, p. 27.

¹⁰ Sofia supports the continued political and military engagement and presence of the US in Europe, especially in South-Eastern Europe. It is noteworthy that the most ardent supporters of NATO and US primacy in military and security matters are the professional military, while professionals from law enforcement are more pro-EU. The wider defence establishment’s readiness to participate in or support military interventions elsewhere can be traced to its desire to acquire experience. Politicians are more sensitive to public opinion and criticisms.

¹¹ Article V of the Washington Treaty is still more credible if not more appealing to new members than Article V of the WEU treaty, though the last one will be subject to closer cooperation as foreseen in the constitutional treaty. See Franck and Pyszna-Nigge, New Members, p. 8.

¹² On the ESS see Sven Biscop, ‘The European Security Strategy: Implementing a Distinctive Approach to Security’, in Securité and Strátegie, Royal Defence College Paper no. 82, Brussels, March 2004. On country-specific divergences, see Anna Michalski and Matthias Heise, European Convention on the Future of Europe: An Analysis of the Official Positions of EU Member States, Future Member States, Applicant and Candidate States, The Clingendael Institute, Working Paper, April 2003; Olaf Osica, ‘A Secure Poland in a Better Union? The ESS as Seen from Warsaw’s Perspective’, German Foreign Policy in Dialogue, vol. 5, no. 14, 14 October 2004.

¹³ We adhere to the notion of strategic culture in Stine Heiselberg, Pacifism or Activism: Towards a Common Strategic Culture within the European Security and Defence Policy? Danish Institute for International Studies Working Paper no. 2, April 2003, pp. 3-7.

¹⁴ This document is still a mix of President George Bush’s National Security Strategy and the ESS.

¹⁵ See Martin Zaborowksi, From America’s Protégé to Constructive European: Polish Security Policy in the Twenty-First Century, European Union Institute for Security Studies Occasional Paper no. 56, December 2004, pp. 5-9.